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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT        COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
In the Matter of the Application of
VINCENT DOWLING,#92-A-6902,
                           Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules RJI #44-1-2014-0797.34
INDEX #144670
           -against-                                             ORI # NY044015J              
TINA STANFORD, Chairwoman, 
NYS Board of Parole,
      Respondent.      
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Vincent Dowling, verified on November 13, 2014 and filed in
the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on November 19, 2014.   Petitioner, who is an
inmate at the Riverview Correctional Facility, is challenging the February 2014
determination denying him discretionary parole release.  The Court issued an Order to
Show Cause on November 24, 2014 and has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer
and Return, including confidential Exhibits B, C and I, verified on February 6, 2015.  The
Court has also received and reviewed petitioner’s Reply Affidavit, sworn to on
February 17, 2015 and filed in the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on February 20,
2015.
On July 7, 1992 petitioner was sentenced in Nassau County Court to a controlling
indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life upon his convictions, following pleas, of the
crimes of Murder 2° and Intimidating of Witness 3°.  The judgment of conviction was
affirmed on direct appeal to the Appellate Division, Second Department.  People v.
Dowling, 209 AD2d 634, lv denied 85 NY2d 937.
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After having been denied discretionary parole release on four prior occasions
petitioner made his fifth appearance before a Parole Board on February 12, 2014. 
Following that appearance a decision was rendered again denying him discretionary
parole release and directing he be held for an additional 24 months.  The parole denial
determination reads as follows:
“AFTER CAREFULLY REVIEWING YOUR RECORD, A PERSONAL
INTERVIEW AND DUE DELIBERATION, THIS PANEL CONCLUDES
THAT DISCRETIONARY RELEASE IS NOT PRESENTLY WARRANTED
AS THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY YOU WOULD NOT LIVE
AT LIBERTY WITHOUT AGAIN VIOLATING THE LAW AND
FURTHERMORE, YOUR RELEASE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH
THE WELFARE OF SOCIETY.  YOU STAND CONVICTED OF THE
SERIOUS OFFENSE OF MURDER AND INTIMIDATION INVOLVING
THE BEATING, STOMPING, STANGLING [sic, presumably meant to be
STRANGLING] AND SUFFOCATION OF THE VICTIM CAUSING HER
DEATH.  THE PANEL MAKES NOTE OF ALL STATUTORY FACTORS
INCLUDING YOUR REHABILITATIVE EFFORTS AND PROGRAMING,
RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT, REEENTRY [sic] PLANS, LETTERS
OF SUPPORT, SENTENCING MINUTES, AND YOUR IMPROVED
DISCIPLINARY RECORD.  THE BOARD NOTES THAT YOUR LAST
TIER 3 TICKET OCCURRED IN 2011 AND INVOLVED DRUG USE. 
THE BOARD NOTES YOUR ACCOMPLISHMENT AND URGES YOU TO
CONTINUE TO WORK ON YOUR ISSUES AND TO REMAIN DRUG
FREE.  A DRUG TICKET ALTHOUGH ALMOST 3 YEARS AGO IS OF
CONCERN TO THE BOARD AS YOUR CRIME INVOLVED DRUG USE. 
AT THIS TIME, THE PANEL HAS DETERMINED AFTER WEIGHING
ALL REQUIRED FACTORS, YOUR DISCRETIONARY RELEASE IS
DENIED.” 
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the February 2014
parole denial determination was received by the DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals Unit on
July 23, 2014.  The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its findings and




Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law.  In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-
i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268,
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.  See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
A significant portion of the petition is focused on the assertion that the parole
denial determination was improperly based primarily on the nature of the crimes
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underlying petitioner’s incarceration, as well as his prison disciplinary record, without
adequate consideration of other relevant statutory factors.  A Parole Board, however, need
not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider in connection
with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of
those factors in its written decision.  See Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23
NY3d 903, Valentino v. Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York State Division of
Parole, 47 AD3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of
a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the Board
gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed the
statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted,
by the facts in the record.  Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process,
given that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally
or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.”  Comfort v. New York
State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar, reviews of the DOCCS Parole Board Report (February 2014
Reappearance Report) and transcript of petitioner’s February 12, 2014 Parole Board
appearance reveal that the Board had before it information with respect to the appropriate
statutory factors, including petitioner’s prior criminal record, therapeutic/vocational
programing records, educational achievements, COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment
Instrument, sentencing minutes, disciplinary record and release plans/community support
in addition to the circumstances of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration and
his prison disciplinary record. The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the hearing transcript
to suggest that the Parole Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor or
otherwise prevented him from expressing clear and complete responses to its inquiries. 
In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
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failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.  Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s
incarceration as well as his improved, but still troubling, prison disciplinary record.  See
Olmosperez v. Evans, 114 AD3d 1077, Shark v. New York State Division of Parole Chair,
110 AD3d 1134, and Veras v. New York State Division of Parole, 56 AD3d 878.
Specifically with respect to petitioner’s prison disciplinary record, the Court notes
that in the almost 19 years from the time he was received into DOCCS custody in August
of 1992 until July of 2011, petitioner incurred 12 Tier III and 19 Tier II disciplinary
violations.  Although the Parole Board noted that petitioner had maintained a clean
disciplinary record for approximately 31 months immediately preceding his February 12,
2014 reappearance interview, it also noted that his most recent disciplinary violation (July
of 2011) was a Tier III violation for drug use.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, petitioner’s
August 2013 completion of the DOCCS ASAT (Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment)
program was discussed during the reappearance interview.  Nevertheless, in view of the
fact that petitioner’s underlying crimes of incarceration were committed at a time he was
admittedly abusing drugs and alcohol, the Board’s concern with respect to the July 2011
infraction is not irrational.  Petitioner’s clean disciplinary record during the 31 months
immediately proceeding his February 12, 2014 reappearance interview might rationally be
viewed as a more compelling factor if it had spanned a substantially broader portion of the
21½ years petitioner’s spent incarcerated prior to that interview.      
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Petitioner also argues, in effect, that the Parole Board improperly evaluated his risk
assessment in that he was scored as a low risk for committing a new violent felony offense,
for rearrest and/or for absconding.  This Court notes, however, that  although the
Appellate Division, Third Department, has determined that a risk and needs assessment
instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in connection with post-September 30,
2011 parole release determinations (see Linares v. Evans, 112 AD3d 1056, Malerba v.
Evans, 109 AD3d 1067, lv denied 22 NY3d 858 and Garfield v. Evans, 108 AD3d 830),
there is nothing in such cases, or the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), to
suggest that the quantified risk assessment determined through utilization of the risk and
needs assessment instrument supercedes the independent discretionary authority of the
Parole Board to determine, based upon its consideration of the factors set forth in
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an inmate should be released to parole
supervision.  The “risk and need principles” that must be incorporated pursuant to the
amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), while intended to measure the rehabilitation
of a prospective parolee as well as the likelihood that he/she would succeed under
community-based parole supervision, serve only to “ . . . assist members of the state board
of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”  
Executive Law §259-c(4)(emphasis added).  Thus, while the Parole Board was required to
consider the COMPAS instrument when exercising its discretionary authority to determine
whether or not petitioner should be released from DOCCS custody to community-based
parole supervision, it was not bound by the quantified results of the COMPAS assessment
and was free to grant or deny parole based upon its independent assessment of the factors
set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) including, as here, the nature of the underlying
crime and his prison disciplinary record.   See Rivera v. New York State Division of
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Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 and Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896, aff’d 117 AD3d 1258, lv
denied 24 NY3d 901. 
Petitioner also argues that his Parole Board “ . . . failed to offer any detailed reason
or fact based rationale for its conclusory statement that ‘release would deprecate the
seriousness of the offense and undermine respect for the Law.’  Such a critical failure is
fatal to the decision.” (Citations omitted).  The Court notes, however, that petitioner’s
Board never reached the conclusion purportedly quoted above.  In any event, the Court
finds that the February 2014 parole denial determination was sufficiently detailed to
inform petitioner of the reason(s) underlying the denial and to facilitate judicial review
thereof.  See Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295 and Ek v.
Travis, 20 AD3d 667, app dismissed 5 NY3d 862.  Finally, the Court finds no merit to
petitioner’s assertion that the February 2014 parole denial determination stemmed from
an unspecified executive policy dating back to the administration of Governor Pataki.  See
Cartagena v. Alexander, 64 AD3d 841 and Lue-Shing v. Pataki, 301 AD2d 827, lv denied
99 NY2d 511.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
Dated: May 15, 2015 at
Indian Lake, New York ___________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Justice, Supreme Court
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